Friday 16 March 2012

Highmoor Cross Shootings

This incident is a fairly well known one, due to the extreme nature of the incompetence displayed, with its suggestion that we have a grave misunderstanding of what the police are there to do.

Despite the likely familiarity I will give an overview of events. A family barbecue was interrupted by the ex husband of one of the females present, who climbed over a wall into the garden and shot three of the women. Two died, both we understand shot to a degree that they couldn't survive and the third wounded, badly in the stomach.

The man then left. Neighbours attended, attempting to help those shot and called emergency services for help. At this point, something strange happened. The most senior officer, as is usual, at the control centre taking the call was an Inspector, not a terrifically high rank perhaps. He decided that no police should attend the scene. His reasoning appeared to be that it would put police officers in danger, though with no police there, pedestrians and vehicle traffic still passed the location. Consequently his actions were only for the protection of police officers. That was his over-riding concern.

Obviously he was told by the civilians present that the gunman had left, but he chose to ignore this as potentially unreliable information. Eventually it was decided to deploy armed officers, but not to the incident. Those dealing with the injured frantically requested help 50 times, frequently being told by the control centre that they would be there in a few minutes (as they thought police would de dispatched).

As more senior officers arrived to get involved decisions moved on. To establish a time line; the initial reports came in to police at 4:37pm. At 5:41pm armed police actually went into the house and reported that the gunman had gone. Ambulances and paramedics turned up at 6:04pm, (it should be noted though, that at first the paramedics refused to attend as the offender had not been located. They finally agreed when provided with an armed escort).

The 'process' gridlock occurring within the command structure is put down in the IPCC report, to a focus being placed on finding the offender, not dealing with the victims. I'm not sure how a human being could make that decision, as if it was a one or the other choice, let alone a report that accepts it in any way, shape or form.

The report finds that the lack of urgent response was wrong but later states that they are not advocating 'that all firearms incidents are responded to immediately', as this would be 'irresponsible and reckless'. I find this amazing. Police officers should not be ordered to risk their lives, but should be expected to attend, taking care. We may have known the specific threat here, a gunman, but can police attend riots?

Maybe officers should not deal with fights? What if someone produces a previously unseen weapon? Where does the 'caution' inherent in this advice end?

It appears that the priorities for senior officers on hearing of a shooting with multiple victims were; 'finding rendezvous points, briefing senior commanders, obtaining tactical advice and setting up a command suite'. Which leaves you asking yourself 'and these people serve us how?'

The IPCC  report makes a number of recommendations and does say that none of those would work if the culture remained unchanged. This is the only hint that they have any inkling of what actually went wrong; a policy had been drawn up and a culture engendered that was diametrically opposed to the true function of the police. How can police officers ever, ever come to the conclusion that they are merely a bureaucracy and that the public turning to them in times of mortal danger is outrageous and they will not suffer it.

This fundamental misunderstanding of purpose is at the root of most failings in today's police force. The mindset is faulty at its core; the senior officers. This is the maturing generation of 'graduate policing' whereby cadets with Degrees were fast-tracked to senior roles. This has apparently only resulted in an intellectually corrupted police force, one that doesn't understand the simplest concepts of policing. This may be due to the lack of actual police work they have done in their 'career'.

And now we have a review saying this failed process should be more extensive!

Do you know how they decided to send in an armed unit? A plain clothes Detective Sergeant went, on his own initiative and in his own car, direct to the address and reported back on the situation. The report applauds his action saying that this was what should have happened at the outset (though possibly an ARV), which is true and highlights the failure of senior officers, wrapped up in their intellectual approach, as they were. His action though, is exactly the basic desire to do the job, to help people that we want and thought we had established over the decades.

I find myself wondering if the DS had a Degree and if so, what role this played in his decision making. And if he had no Degree, if it mattered. Wisdom is the application of knowledge and knowledge can be acquired through experience as well as reading, sometimes with greater understanding. Knowing the theory doesn't always help when faced with a real situation.

The police have to relearn their role and then rebuild a force that fulfils that role. It may require the dismissal of some officers for whom politics and trade unionism, lectures and libraries are more suited.

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